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DUE PROCESS OF LAW UNDER THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION
Surprising as it may seem, there is probably no more im-
portant clause in the United States Constitution than the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A similar clause
is found in the Fifth Amendment. The'clause in the Fourteenth
Amendment is a limitation upon the action of the state govern-
ments; the clause in the Fifth Amendment is a limitation upon
the action of the Federal Government; but otherwise the clauses
are the same and should be given the same meaning. The Due
Process Clause in the Fifth Amendment has received very little
attention from the United States Supreme Court; but that august
tribunal is constantly at work upon the Due Process Clause in
the Fourteenth Amendment. Already, perhaps, that clause has
been involved in more litigated cases than all the other clauses
of the United States Constitution combined, and the end is not
yet. It has not as yet been sufficiently considered for the United
States Supreme Court to attempt a definition of due process of
law; neverthelesse under it, the Supreme Court has declared acts
of legislatures unconstitutional, established the public policy of
our government and almost rewritten our Constitution. What
its future history is going to be no one can prophesy, but it is safe
to prophesy that it is going to have as great a history in the fu-
ture as it has had in the past.
(331)
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The United States Supreme Court, largely through the in-
fluence of John Marshall and because it is appropriate that that
branch of the government least affected by the Constitution
should exercise such a power, has arrogated to itself the power
to declare unconstitutional any executive or legislative acts (state
or federal as the case may be) in violation of any of the clauses
in the Constitution.' Any such act, therefore, which, in the
judgment of the Supreme Court, is not due process of law, is
liable to be declared unconstitutional. Hence it becomes impor-
tant to know the meaning which the Supreme Court has given
or is going to give to the clause due process of law. Does it
apply to legislation as well as to executive acts? Does it apply
to substantive law or only to legal procedure? Whatever mean-
ing the court gives to it, how did it obtain it?
The phrase is not one coined by the Supreme Court, nor
even by the Fathers of the Constitution. It was a well-known
English phrase, found in important English documents, and was
taken by the makers of our Constitution from such English
sources. The United States Supreme Court, although it has
refused to formulate a definition of due process of law, has said,
"Tue words 'due process of law' were undoubtedly intended to
convey the same meaning as the words 'by the law of the land,'
in Magna Charta." 2 Any effort to determine the meaning of
the words "due. process of law" in United States history should,
therefore, begin with an effort to determine the meaning of those
words in English history.
The words "by the law of the land," with which the words
"due process of law" are said to be synonymous, seem to occur
for the first time in the thirty-ninth chapter of King John's Char-
ter of Liberties, where it is said: "Nullus liber homo capiatur,
vel imprisonetur, aut disscisiatur, aut utlagetur, aut exuleter, aut
ahquo inodo destruatur, nec super eurn ibimus, nec super eum
mitteinus, nisi per legate judicium parium suorum vel per legate
terrae." ("No freeman shall be arrested, or detained in prison,
'Marbury v. Madison, z Cranch 137 (U. S., 18o3); Fletcher v. Peck, 6
Cranch 87 (U. S., i8io).
'Murray v. Hoboken L. & I. Co., i8 How. 272 (U. S., i8SS); Davidson Y.
New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97 (1878).
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or deprived of his freehold, or outlawed, or banished, or in any
way molested; and we will not set forth against him, or send
against him, tuless by the lawful judgment of-his peers and by
the law of the land.")
Edward the III substituted "by due process of law" for "by
the law of the land"; and in the Petition of Rights (to Charles
I) the language used was "that freemen be imprisoned or de-
tained only by the law of the land, or by due process of law,
and not by the king's special command without any charge." 
a
Vhat was the meaning cf the words used in Magna Charta?
The word "freemen" (liber homo) probably included no one but
John's feudal tenants in chief and their men:. no one below
mesne lords.' The words "set forth" (ibimus) and "send"
(mittemus) referred to armed attack, without trial or process,
as had been the king's practice against his barons.
5 The words
"by the lawful judgment of his peers" (per legale judicium
parium suorum) meant tenants holding of the same lord and of
the same fief. They did not mean jury trial.
6 The words "by
the law of the land" (per lex terrae) may have meant either the
mode of trial or substantive law, but probably principally sub-
stantive law. Procedure was covered by the clause "by the law-
ful judgment of his peers." In other words, the law of the land
in 12r5 meant the good laws of Edward; the custom of the realm;
the law of the fief but of the whole realm (lex Angliae) ; or
feudal law, applied in a feudal manner by peers of the fief.
7
Essentially the purpose of this section of Magna Charta was to
substitute law for kingly force, but the law substituted was feudal
law. A feudal interpretation of the document is necessary. But
as the feudal system disappeared there was no reason why the
meaning of "freemen," "peers," and "law of the land" should
not be extended, and it was. However, in England, the meaning
of "the law of the land" has never been extended so as to apply
'i Stat. at Large (Eng.) 10; 7 Stat. at Large (Eng.) 318; TA-.oes Duz
PRocEss OF LAw, z, 9.
' 14 CoL. L. REv. 42.
$ 14 COT- L REv. 43.
a 14 Cot- L. REv. 44.
'14 Cot- L Rav. So; CoKi's I-sT. 46.
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to the control of legislation. Any act of Parliament is the law
of the land, or due process of law. And it should be noted that
in England the phrase due process of law has received practically
no judicial construction in litigated cases.
Coke is responsible for the dictum that the common law
will control acts of Parliament, that is, that there are certain
fundamental rights which are supreme over legislation; a but
this dictum was disavowed in England in the case of Lee v. Bude,
etc., Ry.; 9 and Coke did not base his dictum upon the guarantee
of due proceess of law.
This is the only light English history throws upon the mean-
ing of due process of law.
Now, let us turn to United States history. What is the'
meaning of due process as developed by the United States Su-
preme Court?
The history of the development of the due process clause
by the United States Supreme Court seems to be as follows. At
first and early in the history of the court the Supreme Court ap-
proved of Coke's dictum of a supreme fundamental law.10 Until
the court took this position there is nothing to show that it set
aside or intimated that it would set aside acts of legislation un-
less in violation of a direct prohibition in the Constitution, like
the prohibition against violating the obligation of a contract,
the prohibition against ex post facto laws, and the prohibition
against taking private property for public use without just com-
pensation. After the approval of Coke's dictum it both inti-
mated that legislation in violation of fundamental law would be
void, and in three decisions actually set aside acts of state leg-
islatures. The case of Loan Ass'n v. Topeka,"' was decided even
after the Fourteenth Amendment, and in deciding, in that case,
that a public purpose was necessary for taxation the court, in-
'Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Rep. i8a.
L R. 6 C. P. 576, 582 (Eng., 1871).
"Calder v. Bull, 3 Dal. 386 (U. S., 1798) ; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87,
x35 (U. S., x8io); Terrett, et al., v. Taylor, et al., 9 Cranch 43, 50 (U. S,
1815) ; Wilkinson v. Leland. 2 Pet. 627, 657 (U. S., x829) ; W ebster v. Reid,
ix How. 437, 44o (U. S., 1851); Pacific Mail Stm. Co., 17 How. 596 (U. S.,
1854) ; Loan Ass. v. Topeka, 2o Wall. 655, 662 (U. S., 1875).
U Supra.
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stead of placing the unconstitutionality of a law levying a tax
for a private purpose on the lack of due process, placed it on
Coke's dictum and used the following language:
"There are limitations on such power which grow out
of the essential nature of all free governments; implied res-
ervations of individual rights, without which the social com-
pact could not exist, and which are respected by all govern-
ments entitled to the name."
Prior to this decision there had been only one case, the case
of Murray v. Hoboken L. & L Co.,
12 in which the Supreme
Court had set aside legislation on the ground that it was not due
process of law, and this was a case involving legal procedure and
not substantive law. The due process clause was rarely invoked
so long as it was only written into the Fifth Amendment, but
after it was written into the Fourteenth Amendment the
docket of the court was "crowded with cases in which," the
Court says, "we are asked to hold that state courts and state leg-
islatures have deprived their own citizens of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law." Finally, with the cas- of
Dazidson v. New Orleans (1878),13 and a long line of cases
following it,14 Coke's doctrine of a supreme fundamental law
was merged in the doctrine of due process of law; and legisla-
tion has since then been set aside because not due process of law,
but not because in violation of some supreme fundamental law.
In applying this new doctrine the Supreme Court proceeded
gradually, and it was at first very liberal in construing statutes.
It at first applied the doctrine only to matters of procedure,
5 and
upheld as due process of law not only the legal procedure known
at the time of the adoption of the Constitution but new forms
2 18 How. 272 (U. S., i8s).
1196 U. S. 97 (878).
'Hurtado v. California. 1io U. S. si6 (1883); Chicago, etc., Co. Y.
Minnesota, etc., Com., 134 U. S. 418 (89o); Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34
(i894) ; Reagan v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362 (1894);
C. B. & Q. Ry. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 241 (1897) ; Dewey v. Des Moines,
173 U. S. 193 (1899); Butler v. Holly, 176 U. S. 398 (9oo).
"Bank v. Okely, 4 Vheat. 235 (U. S., i8ig); Murray v. Hoboken L. & L
Co., 18 How. 272 (U. S., 1855); Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97
(1878); Lawton v. Steele, i1o U. S. st6 (i894).
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of legal procedure, like information for indictment
16 and a
jury of eight instead of twelve.17 To hold otherwise, the Court
said: "Would be to deny every quality of the law. but its age,
and to render it incapable of progress or improvement." Is After
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment the court at first also
expressed the opinion:
"We doubt very much whether any action of a state
not directed by way of discrimination against the negroes
as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to
come within the purview of this provision." 19
The view that due process of law should be confined to matters
of legal procedure was well expressed by Judge Edwards of New
York in Westervelt v. Gregg: 20
"Due process of law undoubtedly means in the due
course of legal proceedings, according to the rules and forms
established for the protection of private rights"
After the Supreme Court had made the-due process clause apply
to legislation so far as concerned matters of legal procedure, it
was'easy for it to extend the doctrine to legislation so far as
concerned matters of substantive law. This was the next step
in the development of the doctrine of due process of law in the
United States. In Hurtado v. California (1884),21 the Court
intimated, though by way of dictum, that the concessions of
Magna Charta (apparently including due process of law), "ap-
plied in England only as guards against executive usurpation and
tyranny," have here not only "become bulwarks also against
Hurtado v. California, rio U. S. 5x6 (x883).
"Maxwell v. Dow, z76 U. S. 516 (igoo).
'Hurtado v. California, supra.
"Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (U. S, 1873).
"2 N. Y. 2o2, at p. 20w. justice Miller, of the United States Supreme
Court, expressed the same view in the following language: "It is not possible
to hold that where by the laws of the state the party aggrieved has, as regards
the issues affecting his property, a fair trial in a court of justice, according
to the modes of proceeding applicable to such case, that he has been deprived
of that property without due process of law." Davidson v. New Orleans, 96
U. S. 97 (1878).
n rio U. S. 516 (i883).
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arbitrary legislation; but, in that application, as it would be in-
congruous to measure and restrict them by the ancient customary
English law, they must be held to guarantee, not particular forms
of procedure but the very substance of individual rights to life,
liberty, and property." This dictum was soon followed as prece-
dent,22 and now it is no uncommon thing to have legislation set
aside because it is not due process of law as a matter of sub-
stance, that is, because in the judgment of the members of the
Supreme Court, or a majority of them the legislation is unreason-
able.23 Finally, the Supreme Court extended the protection of
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not only
to other individuals than negroes, but to the protection of the
property rights of corporations. 24 This made the Fourteenth
Amendment read as though it was written, nor shall any state
deprive any person of life or liberty or any person or corporation
of property without due process of law. This result was brought
about through the efforts of corporations; through a change in
the personnel of the bench; and through the personal activity of
Justice Field, who had always championed this doctrine and who
strangely, in writing an opinion for the Supreme Court cited his
own opinion while a circuit judge as the opinion of the Supreme
Court.25  It gave litigants what Justice Miller, in Dazodson v,.
New Orleans,26 intimated that they desired "a means of bring-
ing to the test of the decision of this court the abstract opin-
ions of every unsuccessful litigant in a state court of the justice
of the decision against him, and of the merits of the legislation
on which such a decision may be founded." As a consequence it
'Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, etc., Com., i34 U. S.-418 (i89o);
Reagan v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362 (1894); Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578 (1897) ; Lockner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905).
"Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312 (1921); United Mine Workers of
America v. Coronado, etc., Co. 259 U. S. 344 (1922); Wolff v. Court of Indus-
trial Relations of Kansas, 262 U. S. 522 (1923), 267 U. S. 552 (1925); Mini-
mum Wage Board v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 25 (923); Meyer v.
State of Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923).
'Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34 (x894) (as to judiciary); Minneapolis
Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26 (x898).
."Minneapolis Railway Co. v. Beckwith, supra; County of San Mateo v.
Southern, etc., Co., 13 Fed. 722 (x882).
uSutra.
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may now be said that the prohibition of due process of law ap-
plies to legislation as well as to executive and judicial acts, to
substantive law as well as to legal procedure and to corporations
as well as to natural persons so far -as their property rights are
concerned. The Supreme Court still refuses to define the mean-
ing of due process of law. It leaves the question of what is due
process to the opinion of the court in each individual case. But
it now has the power to decide whether or not legislation as well
as executive and judicial acts are due process of law, both as
to substantive law and as to legal procedure, and for corpora-
tions as well as natural persons.26e" In deciding these questions,
There is nothing more that can be said as to the meaning of Due Process
of Law under the United States Constitution. To say that whatever a majority
of the Supreme Court thinks is reasonable is due process of law adds little to
the meaning of the phrase. It is true the Supreme Court has held many differ-
ent kinds of legislation either reasonable or unreasonable, and therefore due
process of law or not due process of law. Under the police power it has held
reasonable, the prohibition of option contracts for future delivery of.grain,
Booth v. Illinois, 184 U. S. 425 (90o) ; the prohibition of the intermarriage of
the different races, Pheasy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (896) ; the prohibition of
combinations in restraint of trade, Aikens v. WVisconsin, 195 U. S. 194 (19o4);
the regulation of public callings, Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 "(1876) ; Work-
men's Compensation Acts, Arizona Copper Co. v. Hammer, 250 U. S. 400
(1919) ; the making of housing a public calling in times of emergency, Block v.
Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135 (1931); the North Dakota industral program, Green v.
Frazier, 253 U. S. 233 (t92o); and it has held unreasonable, the requirement of
the teaching of the English language alone in the public schools, Myers v. Ne-
braska, 262 U. S. 390 (x923) ; the regulation of the size of loaves of bread, Jay
Burns Bakery v. Bryan, 264 U. S. 504 (1924); a minimum wage for women,
Minimum Wage Board v. Children's Hospital, v. Lyons, 261 U. S. 525
(923) ; the Kansas Industrial Court Act, Wolfe v. Kansas. 262 U. 
S. 52
(1923), 45 Sup. CL 441 (1925), and the Oregon School Law, Pierce v. Society,
45 Sup. Ct. 57 (1925). Under the power of taxation it has held reasonable,
the taxation of intangible chattels according to the unit rule, Adams Express
Co. v. Ohio State, i66 U. S. i85 (1895); progressive taxation, Knowlton v.
Moore, 178 U. S. 41 (xgoo) ; the establishment of taxing districts regardless
of benefit, Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, i64 U. S. 112 (1896) ; and
it has held unreasonable the giving of money to a single individual, Loan Asso-
ciation v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655 (1874), and the taxation of a mere debt at the
residence of the debtor, State Tax, etc., 15 Wall. 300 (1872). Under the power
of eminent domain it has held reasonable, the condemnation of land for a pleas-
ure highway, Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles Co., 262 U. S. 700 (1923) ; the building
of spur tracks, Union Terminal Co. v. C. & N. T. Ry., 233 U. S. 211 (1914);
the authorization of individual land owners in arid parts of the United States to
secure the right of way for ditches, Clark v. Nash, 198 U. S. 361 (I9o5), and 
it
has held that it is unreasonable .for a state to tax federal or for the federal
government to tax state property, Utah. etc., Co. v. United States, 243 U. S.
389 (917). From-such decisions it might be possible to prophesy 
what would
be the decision in 'another case exactly analogous, and it might be possible to
make a safe guess Is to what would be the-decision in some other cases, but it
is submitted that up to the present time very little can be learned as to the mean-
ing of due process of law from the decisions of the Supreme Court as-to what
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the Court is sometimes progressive and liberal, sometimes con-
servative, or even reactionary, depending mostly upon the per-
sonnel of the court.
As a result of this short study, we are now in a position to
decide how the due process clause came to have the meaning
which it has under the United States Constitution. The most
important use which it has in the United States is to enable the
United States Supreme Court to declare unconstitutional any
acts of legislation which it -thinks unreasonable. Whatever
other uses the clause may have had in England, it never had this
use. Instead of English qsage affording any authority for em-
ploying the words due process of law as a limitation upon the
powers of legislative bodies, it affords'authority to the contrary.
Yet the words due process of law in our Constitution were bor-
rowed from England. Ordinarily our Supreme Court says that
it will give to words in the Constitution the meaning .which they
had at the time of its adoption. It so held, for example, in the
primary election case,27 and in the pardon case.2 ' If it had
taken the same position with regard to the words due process
of law they would not apply to legislation. But since in this
country the due process clause is held to be a limitation upon the
powers of legislatures, this doctrine cannot be said to be of Eng-
lish origin. Due process of law was never given any such mean-
ing by the English courts. Cokes dictum, even if it was not
bad law, would be no authority for giving any such meaning to
the due process c&use. The real origin of the doctrine is in the
United States Supreme Court itself. It did not find the law; it
made it. It made it by its interpretation of the Constitution.
The language of the Fourteenth Amendment seems to apply to
all branches of the state governments. Therefore, the court in-
ferred, that it was a limitation upon the state legislatures. The
words in the Fifth Amendment must have the same meaning as
in its judgment is reasonable. and what unreasonable. They neither give us a
rule of law, nor a definition. Hence for the meaning of due process under the
United States Constitution we shall have to be content with the statement given
in the text above.
'Newberry v. United States, 256 U. S. 2P2 (1921).
'Ex parte Grossman, 267 U. S. 87 (924).
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those in the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, the court held,
that the due process clause applies to acts of Congress. This
would not have been so startling if the court had confined the
operation of the clause to legal procedure, but when it-extended
its meaning to embrace substantive law it included such mat-
ters as police power, taxation, eminent domain, and violation of
the obligation of contracts. On three of these there are other
direct prohibitions in the Constitution. If the makers of the
Constitution had intended due process of law to have this scope
they evidently would have omitted the other provisions. Hence,
the only conclusion to which we can come is that by the mean-
ing which it has given to the .due process clause the United States
Supreme Court has amended the United States Constitution.
This is not one of the constitutional methods of amendment. Con-
sequently, it looks like a revolutionary act.
29
However, if it is .an amendment, it is an amendment com-
pleted, not one proposed for adoption. For this reason it would
be a work of superogation to discuss the question of whether or
not such a change in our constitutional law should be made. The
most that can be done is to discuss the relative advantages and
diadvantages of the change, unless, perchance, it should be pro-
nosed in turn to .change and abrogate the meaning which the
Court has given to due process of law by a constitutional amend-
inent-
The arguments against the doctrine of due process of law,
which the Supreme Court of the United States has developed,
are:
(i) The doctrine is not a correct interpretation of the Con-
stitution. If the due process clause was interpreted in the light
of the Fourteenth Amendment alone, it might be inferred that
it was intended as a limitation on all the branches of the govern-
ment, but if it was interpreted in the light of the entire Consti-
tution, no such meaning could be given to it, for to do so would
be to make other limitations in the Constitution duplicate limita-
tions and surplusage. If the clause was interpreted in the light
X A. B. A. Jour. Sg.
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of the meaning which it had at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution, or even of the Fourteenth Amendment there would
be even less ground for giving it the meaning which the Supreme
Court has given it. If there was anything in Coke's dictum, as
there was not, it is abundantly covered in the Bill of Rights and
other express limitations found in the Constitution.
(2) Consequently, the power of the Supreme Court to de-
clare legislation unconstitutional because the Court believes it
not due process of law is a usurped power. There is nothing in
the Constitution which gives it to the Supreme Court.
(3) In exercising this power the Supreme Court is tending
to destroy the doctrine of separation of powers, which is sup-
posed to be one of the fundamental characteristics of-our form
of government. Thereby the judiciary not only develops judicial
legislation, as perhaps it will have to be permitted to do if it is to
have a part in the development of the common law in this coun-
try, but it preverts the legislative branch of the government from
functioning.
(4) In exercising this power the Supreme Court is tending
to destroy the doctrine of dual form of government, which is
supposed to be another fundamental characteristic of our form
of government. In deciding whether or not the legislatures of
the various states shall pass laws which they believe to be in
the social interest, the Supreme Court makes itself supreme over
the states.
(5) As a result of all this the Supreme Court tends by its
position to hamper legislation. In various matters it forbids the
stafes from legislating. It does not give the power of legislation
over the subjects involved to Congress. It itself does nothing
affirmative.
(6) The function which the Supreme Court has take'n over
in this negative way is one which could better be performed by
legislative bodies. Could not a large body of representatives in
the halls of legislation, in close touch with the people, and
elected at frequent intervals, better voice the needs of the people,
that is, determine the social interests of the country, than can a
small group of judges, appointed for life, and sitting in Washing-
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ton all of the time? Corporations will answer that it is not merely
a matter of the determination of the social interests of the
country, .but also a matter of the protection of private substan-
tive rights against unreasonable legislation, as, for example, con-
fiscatory rates. But why protection against unreasonable legis-
lation any more than protection against unreasonable judicial
decisions? The Constitution itself protects no definite things.
Extending due process to matters of substance does not protect
the minority against hasty action of the niajority, but simply
transfers to the Supreme Court from the legislatures the decision
of what is reasonable. Why should corporations desire to have
the question settled by the justices of the Supreme Court in-
stead of by legislators? The result in either event would depend
upon the personnel of the body acting. It is conceivable to think
of a Supreme Court, appointed by a President and confirmed by
a Senate, which would be more objectionable to corporations than
Congress itself. As a matter of fact corporations are not clamor-
ing 'for the Supreme Court instead of Congress, but instead of
state legislatures. In other words, they are trying in this round-
about way, to destroy our dual form of government. If that is
their purpose would it not be better to transfer to Congress in-
stead of to the Supreme Court the functions under considera-
tion? Unless we can trust our legislative bodies--whether state
or national-to perform legislative functions (and the deter-
mination of what is reasonable would seem to be such a function)
we might as well abandon all legislative government. The writer
is one of those who is of the opinion that had the power in the
United States to determine what is reasonable been left to legis-
lators-either state or national-the power would have in the
long run been exercised as reasonably as it has been exercised
by our judges.
(7) The doctrine of the Supreme Court creates uncertainty
in the law. It is never known whether an act of Congress or of
a state legislature, if it can possibly touch the due process clause,
is or is not constitutional until after it has run the gauntlet of
the Supreme Court, and it may be ten or more years before the
question is ever presented to the Supreme Court.
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(8) The doctrine tends, by bringing extra litigation to the
court, to overburden a court already overworked.
(9) The doctrine has tended to create a number of com-
missions, which otherwise could be abolished with a social saving
of expense and effort. Then, any regulation to be done .could
be done directly by the legislatures.
(io) The doctrine tends to over-emphasize property, in
that it takes away from state legislatures power over the prop-
-erty rights of corporations, but leaves them free to deal with
other fundamental rights.
Over against these arguments may be set certain arguments
in favor of the doctrine which the United States Supreme Court
has developed.
(i) Property rights are the rights which need protection.
Other rights all have. Property rights some do not have. Those
who have rights need special protection from those who do not
have them.
(2) Corporations also need special protection from those
who think they are easy prey, ;And they will get better protection
-from the Supreme Court than they would from state legisla-
tures.
(3) So far as the doctrine tends to destroy our dual form
of government it is a good thing. The doctrine of dual form
of government and sovereignty of the states has been productive
of harm often, but of good seldom.
Other arguments pro and con could be given, but enough
have been given to show the nature of the problem. The writer
is of the opinion that the Supreme Court so far as concerns
results, did right in extending the meaning of the due process
clause to legal procedure, to the property rights of corporations
so far as concerned legal procedure, and probably even to legis-
lation with reference to legal procedure, but he thinks it did
wrong in extending it to legislation upon matters of substantive
law; and he confesses that he would like to see added to the
Fourteenth Amendment a section to the effect that the due pioc-
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ess clause shall not be interpreted to include matters of substan-
tive law. Most matters of substantive law, most fundamental
rights, are already sufficiently safeguarded by other provisions
in the Constitution. If any further safeguards are needed they
should be provided for by other provisions, not by giving a false
and unnatural meaning to the phrase due process of law. Per-
haps one such provision should be one with reference to retro-
active laws, and another, a provision preventing the federal gov-
ernment from violating the obligation of contracts. The Supreme
Court has held that the exercise of the police power,3 0 taxation 
3 1
and eminent domain 2 is due process of law; that retroactive
laws 3 3 are valid if they could originally have been passed under
the police power, taxation, or eminent domain; and that the obli-
gation of a contract is not impaired by the exercise of the power
of eminent domain, 4 or -the police power," and it should hold
that it is not impaired by the exercise of the power of taxation.
It might be wise to add to our Constitution a clause to the ef-
fect: Neither the states nor the federal government shall pass
any law violating the obligation of a contract, nor pass any other
retroactive law, except in the exercise of the police power, the
power of taxation and the power of eminent domain. Such a
clause would give the Supreme Court sufficient opportunity for
work in the fields of social interest, public purpose and public
use, without opening into these fields the door of due process of
law.
Yet, doubtless, neither of the amendments suggested above
will ever be made. Probably the changes wrought by the Su-
preme Court under the due process clause have come to stay,
and our dual form of government will more and more cease to
be, and instead our government will become in theory as well
as in fact a strong central government with the states little more
'License Cases, 5. How. 5o4 (U. S., 1847).
'
mAdams Exp. Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 166 U. S. z85 (1897).
"Clark v. Nash, 198 U. S. 361 (xgo5).
"United States v. Heinszen, 2o6 U. S. 37o (9o7).
"Long Island Water Co. v. Brooklyn, x66 U. S. i85 (1897).
"Stone v. Mississippi, io U. S. 814 (1879).
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than administrative units. If this is to be true, we should not
merely suffer the evils of the plan but we should take advantage
of its merits. We should at least avoid some of the expense
incident to two systems of government where duplicate, amal-
gamate all of our courts--state and federal-into one great
judicial system, and rid ourselves of the embarrassments and
entanglements-domestic and- foreign-which are the concomi-
tants of sovereignties within a sovereignty.
Hugh Evander Willis.
University of Indiana Law School.
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